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Introduction
The notion that fund managers are highly educated and experienced players within the capital markets is opposed by empirical studies showing that managers largely fail to beat their respective benchmarks (e.g. Malkiel, 1995) . Besides the typical performance evaluation in relation to an index, fund managers are systematically evaluated and measured in relation to peer groups (Lakonishok et al., 1992) . Out of reputational concerns, managers might copy trading decisions of colleagues to avoid falling behind the peer group (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990) . As herding seems to be a solid way to maintain a competitive performance, it is also associated with less working effort for fund managers (Lütje, 2009 A number of studies analyze the existence of herding strategies among money managers worldwide. Although most authors find evidence of herd behavior, at least to a certain extent, the results primarily hold for investments in national stocks of the country observed. 1 Furthermore, as most studies do not control for different fund characteristics, the results remain largely ambiguous, unpredictable, and country-specific. Cross-border investment funds, however, play a major role within the international fund industry.
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According to Bikhchandani and Sharma (2001) , we can categorize the theoretical herding literature into two general groups. The first group includes theories that explain herd behavior as a result of unintentionally related trades and is thus called unintentional or For funds active in more than one specific country, the potential stock investments increase significantly and fund portfolios become more complex. For example, Bolliger (2004) finds that the degree of international diversification of financial analysts' portfolios has a negative impact on forecast accuracy. Similarly, the information flood from various national stock markets might jeopardize a successful stock-picking strategy for money managers and herding strategies might become more attractive. The goal of this study is to investigate mutual fund herding within an international stock universe and to analyze the impact of portfolio complexity on herd behavior. Additionally, we introduce a simple and intuitive way to assign levels of herding to individual funds in order to analyze whether certain funds persistently herd more strongly than others.
1 See for example Grinblatt et al. (1995) , Wermers (1999) , Walter and Weber (2006) , or Kremer and Nautz (2011) . 2 E.g., in the German mutual fund market, the market share of equity funds purely investing in German stocks accounts for only 11.8% within our fund sample.
spurious herding. The second group describes herd behavior as intentional reproduction of others' trading decisions.
Unintentional herding is usually fundamentals-driven: since all investors possess the same information, trading decisions are often identical and cause high levels of herding for specific stocks (e.g. Froot et al., 1992 or Hirshleifer et al., 1994 . Assuming that asset managers have similar educational backgrounds, they should also analyze information analogously. A further potential explanation of unintentional herding is that fund managers might follow fads (Friedman, 1984) , causing significant stock herding within certain industries as funds herd into or out of a particular group of stocks.
Intentional herding originates from two basic theories. Either managers herd due to reputational reasons or due to a lack of information. Reputational herding originates from Keynes' assumption (1936, p. 158 ) that "it is better for reputation to fail conventionally than to succeed unconventionally." The alternative intentional herding explanation claims the cause of herding to be imprecise private information. Imitating prior trades of better informed fund managers seems to be particularly rewarding when information is sparse (Bikhchandani et al., 1992) . In contrast to this argument, we believe that nowadays managers often have to deal with an information overload, including conflicting signals. One way for managers to deal with the information flood is to disregard the private signals and instead trade in accordance with others.
In order to detect herding empirically, most studies employ a herding measure developed by Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992;  hereafter the LSV measure). With respect to herding by money managers, Lakonishok et al. (1992) find only weak evidence for herding among US pension funds over the period from 1985 to 1989. Grinblatt et al. (1995) and Wermers (1999) identify statistically significant levels of herding for the US mutual fund industry. Employing a different measurement approach, Sias (2004) In accordance with our assumptions, we detect statistically significant higher levels of herding among managers that face a more complex investment task. We approximate a fund's portfolio complexity by its investment focus, the number of stocks held, and equity assets These numbers also underline the importance of professional asset managers' trading strategies for stock markets and investors.
Across the entire sample of equity funds, we find a LSV measure of 4.28% for the 10-year observation period from 2000 to 2009. This average can be interpreted as meaning that if 100 funds trade a given stock in a given period, then approximately four more funds trade in the same direction than would be expected if each of them chose its stocks randomly and independently. To a significant extent, the detected herding can be explained by funds within the same mutual fund management company trading alike. However, we also find significant levels of herding among funds belonging to different fund families.
4 See BVI-Investmentstatistik (2011).
5 Data provided by DAI (Deutsches Aktieninsitut e.V.). 6 According to Deutsche Börse the market capitalization of all German equities was €900.7 billion at the end of 2009.
under management. Our analyses on herd behavior of individual funds reveal that significant buy-herding funds do not seem to herd with the same intensity when selling stocks and vice versa. In addition to that, we discover that within the two quintiles of funds that herd least and that herd most, 33% of the funds show similar levels of herding again in the next period.
Apparently, managers seem to follow similar extensive herding strategies across different periods.
7 2 Data sample and methodology for measuring herding
The remainder of the paper is arranged in three sections. The following section discusses our database, presents some descriptive statistics, and describes the methodology employed to detect herd behavior. Section 3 introduces and interprets our empirical results of herding. Finally, section 4 concludes.
Description of database
Our empirical study focuses on equity funds distributed in Germany, regardless of their general investment strategies. We construct our fund universe by filtering the FactSet
Research Systems' lists of active and liquidated mutual funds for those that were licensed for distribution in Germany for at least one year during our investigated period from 01 January, 2000 to 31 December, 2009. Therefore, our sample is not prone to the well documented survivorship bias. 7 If the detected herding was the result of random trading decisions, funds of a given herding quintile should be equally distributed across all herding quintiles in the next period, i.e. only 20% in each quintile. 8 According to Wylie (2005) , the analyses of survivorship biased databases misstate the real level of herding, since the reason for the observed funds' survival might be conditional upon the avoidance of trading strategies that lead to liquidation or merger with other funds. 9 The regulations are stated in §44 InvG.
Of the 1,181 observed funds, 697 publish their reports in the second and in the fourth quarter of the year, the remaining 484 in the first and third quarter. We follow the suggestion of Walter and Weber (2006) and only include mutual funds that either report in a June to
December cycle or in a March to September cycle in our sample. A different approach is to synchronize data by extrapolating the reported holdings on dates not matching the given reporting cycles to the nearest dates of the given reporting cycles (Wermers, 1999) . Since this process might dilute data quality, we do not apply it to reports that are not in line with the main reporting cycles. Further, the sample is free of passively managed index funds as herding analyses are only meaningful if fund managers are not restricted in their purchase decisions. We identify trading activity of each equity fund based on changes in its semiannual stock portfolio. A stock being bought or sold in a given period by at least one fund is defined as a stock-period. In order to avoid dilution of data quality, we ignore a fund in the current and the next stock-period when calculating the degree of herding, if holding information in a specific period is missing. In addition, stock-periods in which no trading occurs but equity stakes change due to capital actions, for example stock splits, are also excluded. We receive the necessary data on capital actions from Datastream. Across all ten years, the average number of funds observed per year is 654. In contrast to previously published studies on herding behavior in the German investment fund market, we do not limit our analysis to the major fund providers, nor do we exclude funds that do not primarily invest in German stocks. With a 10-year window, we also derive our findings from a much larger observation period.
Descriptive statistics
Panel B summarizes the net equity assets of our fund universe. 11 The mean equity value per fund varies significantly over time and so does the total equity value of all funds.
Across all ten years, the average equity value per fund is €274.1 million. Regarding the total market value of all funds, the data reveals the recovery of the fund market in 
The LSV measure of herding
In accordance with most other studies on mutual fund herding, we follow the measurement approach introduced by Lakonishok et al. (1992) . This allows us to compare our results with prior herding studies on the German and international stock markets.
The LSV measure defines herding as the average tendency of a given subgroup of managers to accumulate on the same side of the market in a given stock within the same time period, more often than would be expected if the managers traded independently. The herding measure HM i,t for stock i in period t (stock-period i,t) is expressed as follows:
where B i,t (S i,t ) "counts" the number of funds buying (selling) a stock i in period t. More precisely, p i,t is the proportion of all funds trading stock-period i,t that are purchasers. The buy probability p t represents the overall signal in the market and is calculated as the number of buyers in t aggregated across all stocks i divided by all trades n (i.e., buys and sells) in t:
This buy probability serves as expected proportion of buyers that stays constant across all stocks in a given period t, changing only over time. The subtraction of p t corrects for "marketwide herding" that might be the result of large net inflows.
If no herding exists, the herding measure should be zero. However, the expression
is defined in absolute terms and without subtracting an adjustment factor AF i,t likely to be greater than zero. AF i,t is the expected value of |p i,t ─ p t | which we calculate under the assumption that trades follow a binomial distribution with two possible outcomes: B i,t (success) and S i,t (failure). In other words, the adjustment factor simply controls for the probability that the observed trading behavior is the result of a random process. Under the null hypothesis of no herding, the probability of B i,t is p t .
A positive HM i,t value that significantly differs from zero indicates a tendency of a group of funds to trade a given stock together and in the same direction in a given period above random distribution of trading decisions. To measure the extent to which a specific subgroup of funds herds in a typical stock-period during an observed time frame, we need to average the LSV herding measures, calculated for the group, across all stock-periods (we denote the average as HM). Again, a positive and statistically significant HM is an indication of herding by the observed subgroup of funds. In accordance with Wermers (1999), we compute the adjustment factor AF i,t and the expected proportion of buyers p t based only on trading by a given subgroup.
Although the LSV measure can be regarded as the standard measure for empirical herding studies, there also exist some drawbacks. One elementary downside is that it does not allow differentiating between fund herding on the buy-side and sell-side. We thus adopt the modification from Wermers (1999) and calculate "conditional" herding measures based on the direction of the trades:
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Letting BHM i,t equal the "buy-herding measure" and SHM i,t the "sell-herding measure", we average the two directional measures separately from each other. In a comparison, we can then analyze whether certain subgroups of funds herd more frequently on the sell-side or the buy-side of the stocks traded.
Applying the LSV measure to individual mutual funds
Another drawback of the LSV measure and its refinement by Wermers (1999) is the fact that we cannot actually distinguish the specific managers that herd from those that do not (Bikhchandani and Sharma, 2001) . We thus expand the measures presented above by applying them to individual funds in a simple and intuitive way.
We assign the calculated measures of directionless and directional stock herding to each individual fund F according to its trading activity within a given period t:
with tv F,t being the total trading value of fund F in period t. Further, tv F,i,t stands for a fund's trading value, pv F,i,t for its purchase value, and sv F,i,t for its sale value of stock i in t.
Within every formation period, the calculated measure of directionless herding (HM i,t ) and, depending on whether the stock was more often or less often bought than expected, either the measure of buy-herding (BHM i,t ) or sell-herding (SHM i,t ) for each stock is assigned to all funds trading the stock. For example, a fund that buys a stock within a given period is assigned the stock's HM i,t and, if the stock was more often bought than expected, the stock's BHM i,t of the respective period. Thereby, each stock herding measure is weighted by the proportion of its trading value to the fund's total trading value within the given period. independently. In his herding study, Wermers (1999) imposes a hurdle of five funds trading a specific stock-period, arguing that only a few funds trading in the same direction would not qualify as a herd. Table 2 also reports results for the restriction of at least five funds being active in a given stock-period. Both, the two and five funds trading restrictions, lead to similar results. Requiring at least five funds to trade stock i in period t, the average level of herding calculated across all stock-periods equals 3.89% (see Panel A), which is only slightly lower than the one calculated for the two funds trading hurdle. In consequence, we will conduct further analyses only on stock-periods traded by at least two funds.
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Insert Table 2 about here.
Results from other studies are presented in Panel B. In comparison to our sample, most other studies are based on a smaller stock or fund universe across a shorter time frame. Only Wermers (1999) covers more stock-periods within his 20-year herding sample. The average LSV measure of 3.89% if at least five funds trade a given stock in our sample is similar to the 15 To avoid overstating individual stock herding measures within internal fund herding levels, we weight a stock's herding measure by the trade's share of the fund's total trading value within the respective period. 16 Grinblatt et al. (1995) also develop a herding measure for individual funds. However, their measure only averages the individual level of directionless herding across all periods, making it not possible to compare individual fund's buy herding and sell herding tendencies across time. 17 See for example Scharfstein and Stein (1990) , Bikhchandani et al. (1992) , Wylie (2005) , and Walter and Weber (2006) . 18 Results based on the five funds trading hurdle are available upon request.
results for American mutual funds found by Grinblatt et al. (1995) If we assume that less developed financial markets show lower information efficiency, we would expect fund managers within these markets to be particularly prone to any information available. Analyzing the trades of one's peers might become an important source of information, leading to herd behavior as informational cascades develop (Bikhchandani et al., 1992) . In accordance with these theoretical predictions, empirical findings exhibit herding measures of 12.44% among Portuguese mutual fund managers (Lobão and Serra, 2006) and 22.60% among Polish pension fund managers (Voronkova and Bohl, 2005) .
Herding within mutual fund management companies
Pronounced levels of stock herding computed for the entire fund universe might be the result of identical trading among funds of the same fund family (Wermers, 1999) . Herd behavior could be triggered by managers reacting to the same "private" signals derived from internal stock recommendations (Frey and Herbst, 2011) or colleagues trading together for lower unit trading costs (Wermers, 1999) . Furthermore, it is likely that, within a company, higher transparency eases the imitation of trades of colleagues (Bikhchandani et al., 1992) .
Reputation-based herding models (e.g. Scharfstein and Stein, 1990) can explain high levels of herding if colleagues are evaluated against each other. Finally, managers of the same investment company simply have more possibilities of informally communicating with each other. The exchange of ideas and opinions regarding certain stocks among colleagues can explain higher levels of herding within a given mutual fund family.
To investigate the issue of herding among funds of the same investment company, we compute the levels of herding within each of the five biggest mutual fund companies separately. We rank the companies by the number of funds they distributed in our 10-year sample.
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Insert Table 3 about here.
Panel A of Table 2 ). In the following of the paper, we will continue using single funds as measurement unit in order to analyze herd behavior within different fund subgroups.
3.3
The impact of portfolio complexity on fund herding
Herding segregated by funds' investment focus
As a statistical approach, the LSV measure is unable to differentiate between intentional and unintentional herding and cannot identify the underlying reasons for a trade. Investigating subgroups of funds and stocks might help explain theoretical models regarding managers' intention to herd. Moreover, we would expect higher levels of herding among funds with similar investment objectives than among the entire fund universe (Walter and Weber, 2006) . Wermers (1999) argues additionally that in a heterogeneous universe of funds, a purchase by one fund is more likely to coincide with a sale by another fund. In unreported analyses, we therefore investigate herding intensities across different fund subgroups and stock subgroups.
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Because our database is not restricted to equity funds primarily investing in German stocks or specific industry stocks, we can approximate a fund's portfolio complexity by its investment focus. In the financial analyst literature, portfolio complexity is commonly determined by the number of companies and industries covered by an analyst (e.g. García-
Meca and Sánchez-Ballesta, 2006). Accordingly, one way to determine the complexity of a fund manager's investment task is to separate equity funds focusing on single countries from cross-border equity funds focusing on multiple countries. As these funds differ in the number of potential stocks in the investment universe, fund managers can devote more or less time to single securities. For example, funds with a German investment focus have fewer stocks to choose from than funds that invest in European stocks. The search problem regarding stock purchases and the portfolio complexity in general increase in line with the number of stock alternatives.
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Bolliger (2004) states that even industry-specialized analysts face a more complicated task if they follow stocks across different countries. Similar to financial analysts, managers of funds focusing on multiple countries have to cope with different accounting practices and national effects such as foreign exchange, interest rates, and commodity price shocks. In Jacob et al. (1999) argue that, on the one hand, larger numbers of companies followed by a single research analyst can result in reduced focus and therefore lower accuracy. On the other hand, following larger numbers of companies could be associated with higher forecast accuracy, as more capable analysts are likely to be assigned greater responsibilities.
Furthermore, following several companies might provide analysts with deeper insights into industry trends. In their empirical analyses they find that the more companies an analyst follows, the less accurate her forecasts are. They ascribe this result to a diffusion-of-focus effect. In a similar study, Clement (1999) documents that analysts' forecast accuracy is negatively associated with portfolio complexity, which he measures by the number of companies and industries followed by single analysts. 20 The results of these analyses are available upon request. 21 Barber and Odean (2008) Insert Table 4 about here. Table 4 presents directionless and directional herding measures for the respective subgroups. Panel A presents HM averaged across all funds with a German equity focus. We find a herding measure significantly lower (HM of 2.55%) than the one among the entire fund universe (4.28%). In the rather small German stock market, fund managers seem to be more capable to gather and manage information independently. Attention-driven trades (Barber and Odean, 2008) might not be as rewarding and the level of herding on the buy-side and sell-side is rather moderate. Apart from the theoretical considerations, we would expect funds licensed for distribution in Germany to have expertise in the German capital market. As a result, managers might rather trust their own information on German stocks than follow other trades and thereby create a herd (informational cascade, e.g. Bikhchandani et al., 1992) .
Panel B shows the herd behavior of funds with a European equity focus and compares
it to the HM of funds focusing on German stocks. Managers of European equity funds have to choose their portfolio holdings from a broader stock universe than managers restricted to German stocks. The HM of 4.12% is remarkably higher than the HM calculated across the German equity focused funds. Thus, these managers seem to trade the same stocks to a greater extent even though they have a lot more options. Higher buy-herding levels than sell-herding levels (4.57% vs. 3.63%) could be an indicator for attention-driven purchase decisions. In accordance with our predictions, Panel C reveals that funds with a global equity focus, i.e.
funds with the most complicated investment task, exhibit the highest levels of herding amongst the subgroups (HM of 4.97%). 22 We allocate the remaining funds into these upper-level groups to assure a sufficient number of funds for the herding analyses. The single-country focus subgroup includes all funds investing in one specific country worldwide. The group of funds focusing on multiple countries includes equity funds investing in emerging markets, Far East, Far East including Japan, Latin America, and Eastern Europe.
To control whether the low herding measures within the single-country investment universe were specific for the German equity focused funds, we calculate the degree of herding across all remaining single-country focused funds (Panel D). Further, Panel E presents the herding results for all remaining funds focusing on multiple countries. Again, we find a statistically significant lower herding intensity (HM of 1.89%) among the singlecountry focused funds than among the less focused funds (4.61%). It seems as if the degree of herding is positively correlated to the complexity of the investment task, approximated by the size of the stock universe from which managers can choose their portfolios.
Herding segregated by fund size
Another way to approximate portfolio complexity is by fund size: the larger a portfolio, the more complicated the manager's investment task. We therefore segregate the funds by size in terms of both, number of stocks held and equity value. Again, we expect the degree of herding to increase in line with portfolio complexity. However, theoretical assumptions suggest that larger funds should be more reluctant to follow informational cascades (Bikhchandani et al., 1992) due to an assumed high research disposal and capacity. As they receive more detailed information, they should be able to trust more on their private signals. Accordingly, in their empirical analysis, Frey and Herbst (2011) find that fund managers trade most strongly in reaction to recommendation changes by buy-side analysts. As stock prices do not reflect the information instantly, it seems to be profitable to respond to private signals inferred from internal recommendations of buy-side analysts working for the same investment company.
At the beginning of each formation period, we allocate every fund to a size quintile (Q1 to Q5) based on the number of stocks held (with Q1 including the smallest funds). We then compute HM across all years separately for each quintile. In our fund sample, funds with a German equity perspective on average held 43 stocks, funds with a European equity focus 65 stocks, and funds investing in equities worldwide 82 stocks across the 10-year investigation period.
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Panel A of Table 5 shows the average herding measures segregated by size in each formation period. We find the highest levels of herding among the largest funds (i.e. funds with the highest amount of stocks, grouped in Q5: HM of 5.58%). With a growing portfolio, managers need to cope with more information about more stocks and less time can be spent To a certain extent, the number of stocks held seems to depend on the size of the stock universe from which a fund manager chooses his portfolio holdings. 23 The remaining single-country focused funds on average held 40 stocks and funds investing in multiple countries 34 stocks.
on analyzing individual equities (Jacob et al., 1999) . This diffusion-of-focus effect seems to induce managers to imitate their competitors, also because herding equals less working effort (Lütje, 2009 ).
Insert Table 5 about here.
The alternative way to segregate funds by size is to allocate every fund to a size quintile (Q1 to Q5) based on the fund's net equity assets at the beginning of every formation period. We then compute HM, BHM, and SHM across all years separately for each quintile (with Q1 including the smallest funds). Once more, our results in Panel B reveal that large funds seem to herd more than small funds and in particular more than medium-sized funds.
The difference in means between the HM of the smallest funds (4.14%), stated in Q1, and the largest funds (5.68%), stated in Q5, amounts to 1.55% and is statistically significant at the 1% level. With more assets to allocate, fund managers face an increased search problem regarding their stock investments. In addition to the increased portfolio complexity of larger funds, the detected herding might be triggered by funds belonging to the same, big mutual fund family and thus reacting to the same "private" signals derived from internal stock recommendations.
These results oppose the observations of Walter and Weber (2006) , who do not find an impact of fund size on herding in their fund sample.
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24 However, as Walter and Weber (2006) only analyze 60 equity funds primarily investing in German stocks, their fund sample is much smaller and more homogenous.
With respect to the smallest funds, we find higher levels of herding in Q1 compared to the three remaining groups, Q2 to Q4. Panel A and Panel B show this effect in particular for the detected buy-herding measures (BHM). If we assume that the smallest funds are usually managed by younger, inexperienced fund managers, reputation-based herding models (e.g. Scharfstein and Stein, 1990) could also explain high levels of herding within our smallest fund subgroup. Career concerns might give young professionals an incentive to herd (Keynes, 1936) . As a matter of fact, Chevalier and Ellison (1999) find more conventional portfolios with less unsystematic risk among younger fund managers. Hong et al. (2000) document that younger analysts are punished more severely for poor forecasts and forecast boldness.
Consequently, they detect more herding among younger analysts than among their experienced counterparts.
Herd behavior of individual mutual funds
Analyzing the herd behavior of individual funds is interesting for two reasons. First, fund managers might differentiate between buy-herding and sell-herding and thus show different directional herding levels. Second, if a fund exhibits similar herding intensities within a given and a succeeding period, it is likely that the degree to which the fund manager trades in accordance with the herd is the result of an intentional decision (e.g. Bikhchandani and Sharma, 2001 ).
Within every formation period, we calculate the individual herding measures introduced in Section 2 for every mutual fund active in the given period. Further, we allocate every fund to a quintile according to its cumulated level of HM F,t , to a quintile according to its BHM F,t , and to a quintile according to its SHM F,t at the end of each formation period. The funds belonging to the quintile with the highest (lowest) herding levels are grouped in quintile H5 (H1).
Panel A of Table 6 shows the distribution of the buy-side and sell-side herding quintiles of single funds in a given period. If the funds' affiliation to a certain BHM quintile does not affect their affiliation to a certain SHM quintile, the funds of a given BHM quintile should be equally distributed across all SHM quintiles, i.e. 20% in each quintile. For the lowest BHM quintile (H1), we find that 6% more funds than expected in an equally distributed allocation belong to the quintile including the strongest sell-side "herders" (SHM quintile H5). Moreover, 27% of the funds that exhibit the strongest buy-herding tendencies (BHM quintile H5) are found in the lowest SHM quintile (H1). Apparently, managers that exhibit significant buy-side herding do not seem to herd with the same intensity when selling stocks and vice versa.
Insert Table 6 about here.
Panel B of Table 6 presents the relationship between funds' directionless herding quintiles in a given and in the next period. Again, if the funds' affiliation to a certain HM quintile does not affect their affiliation to a certain HM quintile in the next period, the funds of a given HM quintile should be equally distributed across all HM quintiles in the next period, i.e. 20% in each quintile. For the modest herding funds of the quintiles H2 to H4 we find 3% more funds than expected to be in the same quintile again in the next period. Of the funds that either do not herd at all (H1) or herd most significantly (H5) within a given period, we find 33% of them to be in the same extensive quintile again in the next period. Panel C and D of Table 6 display the relationships of the funds' directional herding quintiles in a given and in the next period. The two matrices show similar correlations of the funds' affiliation to specific herding quintiles in two consecutive periods. Further, we can statistically reject the null hypothesis that the distribution within the matrix is independent for all four matrices. The detected relationship between a fund's herding intensity in a given and the succeeding period indicates that fund herding is not the result of random trading decisions.
In fact, managers seem to successively follow similar, more or less extensive, herding strategies across different periods.
Conclusion
This paper investigates if equity fund managers in Germany act as a herd in their stock trades and if portfolio complexity has an impact on fund performance. We find an overall herding measure of 4.28% which is rather modest in comparison to results from other European countries. We assume that a large part of the detected herd behavior might be triggered by funds belonging to the same mutual fund company and thus receiving the same research reports. With herding measures that vary quite significantly across the five biggest investment companies, we detect high levels of herding between 4.78% and 8.30% within the fund families. However, we also find statistically significant levels of herding across different mutual fund families.
We approximate the complexity of a fund's investment task by its investment focus, the number of stocks held, and assets under management. Thereby, we find institutional investors to herd more extensively when they invest in stocks from more than one country. It seems as if the degree of herding is positively correlated to the number of potential stock investments. As a result, we detect the highest herding measures among funds with a global equity focus, i.e. the most complex investment focus.
The bigger a fund, the more complicated the investment task, as managers need to cope with more information about more stocks. For both fund size measures -stocks held and assets under management -we find the highest herding levels among the biggest funds. The associated information overload seems to induce managers to imitate each other's trades.
Finally, we introduce a simple refinement of the LSV measure of herding which allows us to assign herding levels to individual funds at the end of each formation period.
Apparently, managers differentiate between buy-herding and sell-herding strategies. We detect that 27% of the funds that exhibit the strongest levels of buy-herding actually do not herd when selling their stocks. We further identify a certain persistence regarding managers' herding intensities: 33% of the funds that herd least and 33% of the funds that herd most show similar levels of herding again in the next period.
The detected tendency of German money managers to herd more if they face a more complicated investment task leaves room for future research. By including different European institutional investors to the fund sample, one could, for example, analyze whether this tendency also holds true within other countries. Moreover, the significant herding levels inside mutual fund management companies should be observed more accurately. As our explanations are based on assumptions, a broad survey of the leading investment companies could shed more light on this topic. Table 1 The equity fund holdings database
Below, we present the key statistics of our database at two-year intervals. The mutual fund holdings database includes portfolio holdings data reported semi-annually from 01 January 2000 to 31 December 2009. The information below is reported for the end of the years and holdings of funds that report in September are considered as being reported in December. The trading statistics in the last panel are only inferred from trades within the last semi-annual formation period of the year. Panel A shows the number of funds included in our sample. Further, Panel B presents the total net equity assets of the average fund and the total equity value of all funds. Panel C displays the average number of stocks held per fund at the end of the respective year. Finally, Panel D includes the total number of trades, the buy-ratio of these trades, and the trading frequency which is the proportion of the total number of stocks traded to the total number of stocks held across all funds within that period. The values in the last column of the Table 2 Overall herding measures and results of other studies (HM and median)
In Table 2 , we calculate the average LSV measure of herding (HM) and the median across all HM i,t traded by at least two and five funds within our equity fund sample. The table also includes the number of stock-periods used to compute the measures and displays results of other studies for the purpose of comparison. Panel A shows the results across our whole fund sample. Due to the large sample sizes, all t-statistics are highly significant. Besides the results of the other studies, Panel B also includes the country of the analysis, the frequency of the respective holding data, and the period observed. Please note that for comparison, we display results for the lowest frequency when different frequencies of reporting dates were observed.
♣ The results are based on the minimal trading restriction of at least one fund trading stock i in t. 
At least two funds trading stock i in period t At least five funds trading stock i in period t Table 3 Herding within mutual fund management companies (HM)
The Table 4 Herding segregated by funds' investment focus (HM, BHM, and SHM)
In In Panel A, we define the size of a fund by its number of stocks within the portfolio. At the beginning of each formation period, every fund is assigned to a size quintile, with the smallest funds belonging to quintile Q1 and the largest funds to quintile Q5. The number of stockperiods for the respective group is shown in parentheses below the herding measures. The calculations of the adjustment factor AF i,t and the expected proportion of buyers p t are based only on trading within each size quintile. In Panel B we approximate fund size by a fund's net equity assets. Each fund is allocated to a size quintile at the beginning of each formation period. Again, AF i,t and p t are calculated separately for each size quintile. We also show differences in means for both panels in the last column. The p-values from t-tests indicating the probability that the means of the two extreme quintiles are equal, are displayed in brackets below the differences. All t-statistics are, unless the means are marked, significant at the 1% level. † Mean herding measure statistically not significant. Table 6 Distribution of directionless and directional fund herding quintiles This table shows herding intensities of individual funds. We assign levels of directionless and directional stock herding to individual funds according to their trading activity within a given period. A fund that buys (sells) a stock i within a given period is assigned the stock's HM i,t and, if the stock was more (less) often bought than expected, the stock's BHM i,t (SHM i,t ) of the respective period. Thereby, each stock herding measure is weighted by the proportion of its trading value to the fund's total trading value within the given period. In every period, we then calculate individual herding intensities for each fund by cumulating its weighted stock herding measures. Every fund is assigned to a quintile according to its cumulated level of HM, to a quintile according to its BHM, and to a quintile according to its SHM at the end of each formation period. The funds belonging to the quintile with the highest (lowest) herding levels are grouped in quintile H5 (H1). Panel A shows the distribution of the buy-side and sell-side herding quintiles of single funds in a given period. Panel B presents the relationship between the funds' directionless herding quintiles in a given and in the next period. Panel C and D display the relationships of the funds' directional herding quintiles in a given and in the next period. We perform chi-square tests and can statistically reject the null hypothesis that the distribution within the matrix is independent for all four matrices, for a significance level of 1%. 
